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Abstract
In most of the recent literature on state capacity, the significance of wars in state-
building assumes that threats from foreign countries generate common interests
among domestic groups, leading to larger investments in state capacity. However,
many countries that have suffered external conflicts don’t experience increased unity.
Instead, they face factional politics that often lead to destructive civil wars. This
paper develops a theory of the impact of interstate conflicts on fiscal capacity in
which fighting an external threat is not always a common-interest public good, and
in which interstate conflicts can lead to civil wars. The theory identifies conditions
under which an increased risk of external conflict decreases the chance of civil war,
which in turn results in a government with a longer political life and with more
incentives to invest in fiscal capacity. These conditions depend on the cohesiveness
of institutions, but in a non-trivial and novel way: a higher risk of an external conflict
that results in lower political turnover, but that also makes a foreign invasion more
likely, contributes to state-building only if institutions are sufficiently incohesive.
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1 Introduction
There is a large and growing literature on the impact of war on state-building.1 Much
of this literature builds on Charles Tilly’s famous phrase, “War made the state and the
state made war” (Tilly, 1975, p. 42). In most of this literature, which includes an
important series of papers that attempt to unify some essential theories about state-
building (Besley and Persson, 2008, 2009, 2010, which I will refer to from now on as
B&P), the significance of war relies on the assumption that threats from foreign countries
generate common interests among domestic groups, leading to larger investments in state
capacity.
This paper develops an alternative theory of the impact of interstate conflicts on fiscal
capacity, in which fighting an external threat is not always a common-interest public good,
and in which interstate conflicts can lead to civil wars. The theory identifies conditions
under which an increased risk of external conflict decreases the chance of civil war, which
in turn results in a government with a longer political life and with more incentives to
invest in fiscal capacity.
The idea that interstate wars have a positive effect on state-building because of their
contribution to the provision of a public good (e.g. national defense) has helped explain
many crucial fiscal innovations in Europe from the 17th to 19th centuries.2 However,
important issues remain. For instance, Gennaioli and Voth (2015) show that during the
period of initial European state building, interstate warfare was mostly a private good
for princes in pursuit of glory and personal power. Pincus and Robinson (2013) argue
that this thesis does not apply to Britain, noting that critical elements of state-building
(such as a monopoly on violence) were not associated with interstate wars but rather were
either uncorrelated with wars or associated with civil wars.
If we extend the hypothesis to other regions and more recent times, the idea that
interstate conflicts generate common interests among groups seems even less plausible.
In the last century, many countries that experienced external conflicts were also affected
by factional politics that drove them to destructive civil wars. Figure I shows the partial
correlation between civil wars and interstate conflicts by plotting the share of years with a
civil war against the share of years with an interstate dispute between 1946 and 2000.3 The
figure shows a significant positive correlation, meaning that countries that experienced
more interstate disputes also experienced more civil wars. This pattern is confirmed
when we look at each interstate dispute and civil war in detail. Between 1946 and 2000,
62% of countries that experienced an interstate dispute also experienced a civil war. In
1See Tilly (1975, 1990) and, more recently, Besley and Persson (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011). Also see
Dincecco (2011), Dincecco and Prado (2012), O’Brien and Yun-Casalilla (2012), Gennaioli and Voth
(2015) and Ko et al. (2018) for European cases, and Lopez-Alves (2000), Centeno (2002) and Thies
(2005) for Latin America.
2See Hoffman and Rosenthal (1997), Dincecco (2011) and O’Brien and Yun-Casalilla (2012).
3The data on civil wars is from the UCDP/PRIO. The data on interstate disputes is from the Correlates
of War (COW) project, and measures whether a given country is engaged in a militarized interstate dispute
(MID) of high intensity (with at least a display of force) in a given year. The underlying regression controls
for executive constraints (between 1946 and 2000), ethnic fractionalization and legal origin.
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addition, more than 67% of civil wars occurred within a window of plus/minus two years
surrounding an interstate conflict.4
Figure I: Civil wars and interstate conflicts (partial correlation)
An abundant literature on conflict has documented close links between civil wars and
conflicts between states that suggests there might be an important causal relationship.5
These examples include post-independence and Cold War periods in Latin America, sub-
Saharan Africa and southeast Asia. Two notable examples, which I discuss in more detail
later, are Mexico following its independence, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC) during Mobutu Sese Seko’s rule. In both cases, the risk of an external conflict
played a crucial role in the occurrence, intensity and persistence of internal conflicts that
these countries experienced during several stages of their history. Other examples include
the risk of a US invasion seeking to prevent “a second Cuba” in Chile , which played a
role in the 1973 Chilean coup d’e´tat (see Collier and Sater, 2004, chs. 11-13), and the
risk of a US trying to overthrow the “Marxist Sandinistas” in Nicaragua, which affected
the Nicaraguan Contra conflict (see Prevost and Vanden, 1999).
If the risk of an external conflict can potentially affect whether a country suffers a civil
war, the hypothesis that interstate conflicts generate common interests among domestic
groups, resulting in more state-building, should be re-examined. This paper provides
an alternative explanation of the impact of interstate conflicts on state capacity that
accounts for the possibility that the likelihood of a civil war depends on the risk of an
4This percentage is lower if instead of looking at high intensity militarized interstate disputes, we look
at interstate “wars,” defined as militarized interstate disputes with a minimum of 1,000 battle-related
combatant fatalities within a 12-month period (see the COW project). This appears to be the definition
used by B&P in their empirical analysis. However, even when we focus on these very high-intensity
conflicts, at least 12% of civil wars between 1946 and 2000 occurred within a window of plus/minus two
years surrounding an interstate war.
5See Gleditsch and Beardsley (2004); Hegre and Sambanis (2006); Gleditsch (2007); Salehyan (2008);
Gleditsch et al. (2008); Cunningham (2010); Salehyan et al. (2011); and Morelli and Pischedda (2013).
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interstate conflict, and that does not assume that fighting an interstate conflict is always
a common-interest public good.6 My aim is to shed light on the process of state-building
(or lack thereof) when countries experience a high risk of an external conflict, as well as
the potential for a related civil war.
The paper focuses on fiscal capacity, understood as the capacity of a state to generate
tax revenue. It uses B&P’s basic framework, which is extended and modified in several
respects. It starts by proposing a baseline scenario where a government can lose power
for three reasons: by losing to a foreign country in an external conflict, or by losing to
the domestic opposition in an internal conflict or an election. Crucially, the opposition
and government face different payoffs if the country loses in an external conflict. The
opposition must decide whether to initiate a civil war, knowing that a civil war may
also weaken the government against the foreign country. The government must decide
whether or not to invest in fiscal capacity without knowing whether the opposition will
trigger a civil war. The paper focuses on how an increased risk of external conflict affects
the incentives of the government to invest in fiscal capacity.
The main result identifies conditions under which an increased risk of external conflict
may either increase or decrease investment in fiscal capacity. The outcome depends on
whether the higher risk of external conflict provides the domestic opposition with enough
incentives to support the government against the external threat. If the heightened risk
of an external conflict significantly strengthens the government domestically, so that it
outweighs the higher risk of a foreign administration, and the probability of political
turnover decreases, it provides the government with incentives to invest in fiscal capacity
insofar as a sufficiently low level of institutional cohesiveness allows it to extract rents.
The conditions under which an increased risk of external conflict either increases or
decreases investments in fiscal capacity implies a new and interesting result: if as a result
of an increased risk of external conflict, the chance that the incumbent stays in power
increases, the government does not always decide to invest in fiscal capacity. The exact
relationship depends on how cohesive institutions are. This result contributes to the
important debate about whether more political stability leads to better public policies
(see Acemoglu et al., 2011), and provides a novel mechanism through which this may not
be the case: when the greater political stability results from a higher risk of an external
conflict.
The baseline model is then extended to include an endogenously chosen level of insti-
tutional cohesiveness. Besides establishing the conditions under which there is a positive
level of institutional cohesiveness and providing an explicit formula for this level, this
extension confirms the results previously mentioned.
The paper also examines two episodes from post-independence Mexico.7 These episodes
illustrate some of the trade-offs that are formalized in the model. In particular, during
6Tilly considers the possibility of a close relationship between interstate disputes and civil wars in
scenarios in which the nationalization and specialization of the military was very weak (see Tilly, 1990, p.
186). He associates this possibility with European countries before dynasties typically controlled states,
and does not directly relate this idea with the analysis of the impact of war on state-building.
7In Appendix A.1, I also discuss one episode from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) during
Mobutu Sese Seko’s rule.
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certain critical periods of Mexico’s history, government decisions about institutions were
significantly affected by the possibility of a civil war, which in turn depended on the
likelihood of a foreign intervention.
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it expands on B&P’s
framework in a novel way. It is similar to Besley and Persson (2008) in that it also studies
the impact of internal and external conflicts on fiscal capacity. They argue that investment
in fiscal capacity is lower when there is a greater risk of a future internal conflict, and
higher when there is a greater risk of a future external conflict. As external conflicts can
also occur in the present, which reduces investment in state capacity, they argue that
the possibility of external conflict has an ambiguous effect. However, and importantly,
their model and results depend on internal and external conflicts being independent.
In particular, they assume that internal conflicts only occur when there is no external
conflict. My model removes this assumption.
This paper also shares similarities with Gennaioli and Voth (2015) and Ko et al.
(2018), which also study the impact of war on fiscal capacity. Gennaioli and Voth (2015)
focus on initial European state-building (1600-1800). By proposing a model and providing
empirical evidence, Gennaioli and Voth argue that war’s impact on state capacity (which
they define as a centralized revenue-collection system) depends on the cost of war and on
the initial level of political fragmentation. In their model, war does not necessarily lead to
state-building when the costs of war are sufficiently low and fragmentation is sufficiently
high. In such a case, it is better for rulers not to invest in centralized revenue collection
because it is expensive, they would have more to lose (in foregone tax revenue) in the
event of defeat, and war can be a cheaper alternative.
Ko et al. (2018) focus on comparing long-term institutional development in China
and Europe. They develop a Hotelling-style model to show how one-sided and two-
sided external threats affect rebellion, political fragmentation, military investments, fiscal
viability and taxation. They find that a bigger external threat always leads to military
investments and decreases the probability of rebellion; whether the threat is one- or two-
sided affects the levels of political fragmentation, fiscal viability and taxation.
Although the design of Gennaioli and Voth (2015) and Ko et al. (2018) share some
similarities with my model, there is one crucial difference. In their models, groups that
form a country or continent act as a single entity when facing a external threat, and
fighting this threat is still a common-interest public good in the sense that losses are
equally distributed when a country loses a war (Gennaioli and Voth) or a continent leaves
a significant part of its territory unprotected (Ko et al.). In my model, a country’s gov-
ernment and opposition can, a priori, support or oppose a foreign threat, which reinforces
or diminishes the impact of the external threat.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section, I discuss the case studies,
with a particular emphasis on how the risk of external conflicts affected decisions about
institution-building. Section 3 presents the model, and Section 4 concludes.
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2 Illustrative Cases
This section briefly discusses two episodes from post-independence Mexico, which
illustrate how the risk of external conflict, and government and opposition responses to
that risk, helps explain important aspects of Mexico’s early state-building process. This
section’s objective is to set the stage for a possible mechanism, which will be formally
developed in Section 3.8
During the first decades of its independence, Mexico experienced a number of episodes
that exemplify two previously described roles of external threats in the state-building
process: a high risk of external conflict (with Spain in 1829 and the United States from
1846-48) followed by either a decrease in political turnover and the implementation of
key fiscal reforms, or by an increase in political turnover and the lack of much-needed
reforms. I focus on two episodes that exemplify these two possibilities: Vicente Guerrero’s
presidency in 1829 and the Mexican-American war between 1846 and 1848.9
2.1 Vicente Guerrero’s Presidency
In April 1829, at the beginning of his mandate, Mexican president Vicente Guerrero
encountered serious challenges, including a series of domestic political conflicts and an
empty treasury. A crucial challenge during his presidency was the Spanish government’s
second reconquest attempt in July 1829. The specific timing was motivated by an inter-
national environment favorable to the reconquest and rich emigrants’ promises to pay for
the invasion plans (Sims, 1984, p. 59).
Another crucial characteristic of Guerrero’s presidency was the occurrence, in August
1829, of a temporary respite in domestic political conflicts because of the Spanish threat.
As Jan Bazant explains, “the long-awaited invasion by Spanish troops came at the end of
July 1829, and it served to cause a temporary lull in the factional political conflict as the
nation rallied to the call for unity” (Bazant, 1985, p. 433). This respite was preceded by
two mass expulsions of Spaniards, who were believed to “represent a threat to Mexican
independence” (Sims, 1990, p. 9).
In the context of these events, at the end of August 1829, Vicente Guerrero requested
and obtained extraordinary powers from the Mexican Congress to enact a tax reform
(see Serrano, 2002; Serrano and Vazquez, 2010). As a result, a national income tax was
established in September 1829, for the first time in the history of independent Mexico
(Serrano, 2005). This fiscal reform constituted “one of the most radical transformations
8As previously mentioned, Appendix A.1 also discusses a Cold War-era case study from the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), which illustrates how the risk of external conflict helps to explain DRC’s state-
building process (particularly the failure of that process). The fact that the formalization in Section 3
also helps to explain this episode, which comes from the post-war era, shows the generality of the model
proposed in this paper: it could help explain both pre-war and post-war conflicts, which, although they
differ in important aspects (such as the level of control sought by the invading countries), also share
crucial similarities. I thank a referee for this observation.
9For other periods and alternative mechanisms that emphasize the role of domestic factors in building
fiscal capacity in Mexico, see Garfias (2018a) for post-revolutionary Mexico and Garfias (2018b) and
Arias (2013) for late colonial Mexico.
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to the tax structure inherited from colonial times” (Serrano, 2005, p. 273).10 As Jose
Serrano says:
On August 18, President Guerrero informed Congress that he considered the constitutional
powers to which the government could appeal to confront the Spanish invasion insufficient
... The Congress ... authorized the Executive Branch to adopt as many measures as are
necessary ... Under the protection of extraordinary powers, Zavala [Guerrero’s minister of
finance] promoted a broad reform of the country’s tax system ... [under this law] lawyers,
doctors, surgeons, scribes and all “professionals” would spend $24, and civil and military
employees, both from the Federation and from the states, would contribute a part of their
salary (Serrano, 2002, p. 106).11
Although the income tax was reversed two years later, this case illustrates how the
risk of an external conflict can result in investments in fiscal capacity: support from the
domestic opposition, which in this case occurred through a respite in internal conflicts
and was preceded by a mass expulsion of Spaniards, gave the government incentives to
propose and implement key fiscal reforms. The model in Section 3 will propose one way
to formalize this mechanism that emphasizes the role of the decrease in political turnover
in providing the government with incentives to increase fiscal capacity.
2.2 The Mexican-American war
The Mexican-American war occurred from 1846 to 1848. It had its origins in the
decree of the US Congress annexing Texas in February 1845, which also made explicit
America’s intention to control California and all territory north of the Rio Grande. A
puzzling characteristic of this period was that, unlike during the second Spanish recon-
quest attempt, Mexicans were divided and lacked commitment to their country (Vazquez,
1997, p. 40; Bringas, 2008, pp. 184-201; Ca´rdenas, 2015, pp. 142-143). Enrique Cardenas
mentions the relevance of the rebellion led by the commander of the reserve army, General
Paredes, who “marched towards Mexico City ... to take power, instead of going to the
border to reinforce the defense” (Ca´rdenas, 2015, p. 142). Peter Guardino also notes this
division in the context of late February 1847’s civil war, in which
[Mexican] National Guard units of differing political sympathies confronted each other in
Mexico City beginning in late February 1847. Many Mexicans understood this as the worst
moment of the war, one in which Mexico’s fractious politics undercut its defense just as the
Americans threatened the center of the country. The conflict made it much easier for the
Americans to launch the invasion of central Mexico that eventually defeated the country
(Guardino, 2017, p. 175).
Numerous diaries of American soldiers also reported a constant astonishment at the
warm welcome they received from the majority of Mexicans, who expressed their desire
that the occupying troops remain (Bringas, 2008, pp. 185 and 190). The reason seems
to be that “local populations thought that they would get rid of the abuses of the local
military and receive economic benefits from the sale of various products or from providing
10See also Jauregui (2003a,b, 2005) and Serrano (2002).
11See also Serrano and Vazquez (2010, p. 417).
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services” (Bringas, 2008, p. 190), and that “the loyalties of the inhabitants, especially
those living on the northern border, had been conditioned by a series of local and regional
alliances, economic ties, and political interests that increasingly linked them to the United
States” (Rese´ndez, 1999).
A second characteristic of this period was that the Mexican government decided to
raise revenues “by mortgaging or selling property belonging to various Catholic Church
organizations” (Guardino, 2017, p. 176), instead of introducing new direct taxes (as
Vicente Guerrero had done two decades prior). The government and Congress emphasized
how important it was that “the executive will be authorized only to take over the assets of
the Catholic Church” (Sordo, 1997, p. 64), and the main reason seems to be, as Mexican
vice-president Gomez Farias explained to Mexico’s president, Antonio Lopez de Santa
Anna, “the distrust [associated with] the misuse of funds and ruinous contracts” (Sordo,
1997, p. 64).
Facing a high risk of invasion by the US and an associated increase in the risk of
an internal conflict, the Mexican government opted for a policy through which it could
only take over the assets of the Catholic Church, instead of widespread and potentially
state-building fiscal reforms. This policy was seen by the government and Congress as the
best alternative given the distrust of the government’s ability to use funds responsibly.
This second case illustrates another mechanism through which the risk of external con-
flict can affect investments in fiscal capacity. If the domestic opposition, in response to an
increased risk of external conflict, decides not to support the incumbent government and
instead exploits the situation and starts an internal conflict, then the increased chances
of political turnover, as well as concerns about increased opportunities for rent extraction
by a future government, could disincentivize the current government from implementing
capacity-building reforms.
3 Model
3.1 Basic Model Setup
There are two countries, D (domestic) and F (foreign), and two time periods, s = 1, 2.
Country D is composed of two groups, A and B, each of which make up half of the
population in every time period.12 F is homogeneous, and is ruled by the same group in
both periods, also denoted by F . The analysis focuses on D. However, F is crucial to the
analysis: through the threat of an intervention, F affects decision-making in country D.
At the beginning of period 1, one of the domestic groups in D (A or B) is chosen
at random to be the government. The government decides on a set of policies to be
implemented during this period. This includes a uniform income tax rate, t1, which
is applied to individuals from groups A and B, and a set of group-specific transfers,
r1 = {rA1 , rB1 , rF1 }, awarded to A, B and F . The government in D also determines,
through investment, the period-2 stock of fiscal capacity, τ2.13
12This is without loss of generality for the main results, and simplifies the exposition (see footnote 20).
13As will be specified below, this is a model of pure redistribution since individuals do not derive utility
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Let I1 ∈ {A,B} be the government in period 1, and O1 ∈ {A,B} its domestic oppo-
sition. After I1 chooses the period-1 policies and investment, O1 decides whether or not
to contest I1’s leadership by triggering a civil war. If O1 decides not to trigger a civil
war, elections occur. Irrespective of O1’s decision, an interstate conflict between F and
D occurs with probability α, which I assume to be exogenous.14 This interstate conflict
can end in an invasion in which F is the new incumbent, or in O1 taking power in period
2 as a result of F ’s direct intervention. Conditional on F winning the interstate war, let
λ denote the probability that O1 takes power thanks to F , and 1−λ the probability that
F establishes a foreign administration.15
The outcome of the interstate conflict, the domestic dispute, and/or elections deter-
mines the government in the second period, denoted by I2 ∈ {A,B, F}. The case I2 = F
occurs if F wins the interstate conflict, and directly rules D by establishing a foreign
administration. In the second period, I2 decides on a new set of policies.16
Political turnover occurs when O1 wins an election or a civil war, or when F establishes
a foreign administration. I assume that conditional on the occurrence of a civil war, the
probability of any of these events is exogenous.17 However, whether O1 triggers a civil
from the consumption of public goods, and government revenue is only spent on transfers.
14By assuming that the probability of an interstate conflict is exogenous and that the occurrence of
a civil war depends only on the opposition’s choice, the model does not explicitly allow for scenarios in
which a civil war occurs mainly because of the support provided to the opposition by a foreign country.
I abstract from these situations, and simply model them as interstate conflicts (the case from the DRC
discussed in Appendix A.1 could fall into this category). However, the theory proposed in this paper is
consistent with scenarios in which a foreign country provides military support to the opposition (or to
the incumbent government), but the theory does not model them explicitly insofar as it does not provide
a micro-foundation for the foreign country’s actions. Endogenizing α is beyond the scope of this paper.
15A larger λ captures scenarios in which a direct foreign intervention primarily seeks a new distribution
of power between the domestic actors, rather than the establishment of a foreign administration. In this
regard, and importantly, 1 − λ can also be interpreted as the extent to which a government led by O1
but that is in power thanks to F ’s direct intervention, is a ‘puppet government’. These scenarios seem to
have been common in the post-World War II period (see Owen 2002). Some potential examples include
the Soviet Union’s 1979 intervention in Afghanistan (see Westad 2005, p. 351-352, and Saikal 2010),
and the US interventions in the Dominican Republic in 1965 (see Westad, 2005, p. 151) and Grenada in
1983 (see Williams, 2007). A more recent example may be the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 (for instance,
see Wilson, 2009). Softer interventions such as Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election
(see The New York Times, 2019) could also be represented by λ. I thank a referee for suggesting this
possibility and for having identified some of these cases.
16Note that by assuming that the model ends in period 2, and that in this period there is no civil war
or interstate conflict, the model does not allow for scenarios in which a civil war is a consequence of an
interstate conflict that ended, for instance, in a foreign administration. The study of these scenarios will
require generalizing the model to a dynamic setting, which is left for future work.
17Endogenizing these probabilities is left for future work. Perhaps the stronger assumption is that
the model does not allow for O1 and I1 to invest resources to increase their chances of victory. Thus,
taxes are only for redistribution (i.e. they won’t be used to finance the military). Note that this idea
differs from Tilly’s main thesis that war makes states because of the need for these states to pay for the
costs of war (although he considers this possibility in Tilly, 1990, pp. 99-103). As we will see later, this
assumption allows for tractable expressions for the effect of an increase in the risk of external conflict on
political turnover and fiscal capacity, thus enabling us to identify each effect and establish a meaningful
relationship between them. In addition, as will be specified below, the conditional probabilities of victory
of each group are assumed to satisfy some restrictions that are consistent with a scenario where some
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war is endogenous; therefore, the ex-ante probability of political turnover (which will be
key to the main result) will be endogenous.
Let  denote the probability that O1 gains power in period 2 if there is no civil war or
external conflict. Let δ be the probability that O1 wins the civil war when there is a civil
war but not an external conflict. Let ρ be the probability that F wins the interstate war
when O1 triggers a civil war and there is an external conflict. Let µ be the probability that
F wins the interstate war when O1 does not trigger a civil war and there is an external
conflict. Let ω denote the probability that O1 wins a civil war if at the same time D is
involved in an external conflict with F .
I make four main assumptions that will simplify the exposition and allow the analysis
to focus on interesting cases. First, I assume that the probability that F wins the interstate
war is larger when O1 triggers a civil war:
ρ > µ (1)
Second, I assume that O1 is more likely to win a civil war if there is also an external
conflict:
ω > δ (2)
Note that (1) and (2) imply that internal and external conflicts reinforce each other: to
secure victory, it is a good idea for both O1 and F to be more aggressive when their
common enemy (I1) is already involved in a conflict.18
Third, I assume that the probability that O1 gains power if there is not a civil war or
an external conflict is larger than O1’s probability of winning the elections when there is
an external conflict.19 This third assumption reflects the idea that leaders are more likely
to be re-elected when there is an international conflict, either because war provides them
with unique opportunities to deal with their opposition (Chiozza and Goemans, 2004), or
because they engage in a “gamble for resurrection” (Downs and Rocke, 1994).
Fourth, I assume that the probability that O1 gains power if there is no civil war
or external conflict is larger than F ’s probability of winning the interstate conflict when
there is no civil war:
 > µ (3)
This assumption is made to simplify the exposition, to rule out trivial cases in which
an increased risk of external conflict always prevents any investment in fiscal capacity
because it increases political instability too much.
Timing
The timing of the game is as follows:
(1) Nature decides the initial stock of fiscal capacity τ1, and I1 ∈ {A,B}.
resources could be used to finance the military. Thus, it is possible to interpret these probabilities as
affected by other resources.
18Of course, this does not mean that O1 will always prefer to attack I1 when there is an interstate
conflict; the analysis will focus on the conditions under which this happens.
19To simplify the exposition, this last probability is set to zero; thus, this assumption is equivalent to
 > 0, which is implied by Eq. (3) below.
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(2) I1 chooses a set of period-1 policies {t1, r1 = {rA1 , rB1 , rF1 }} and determines (through
investment) the period-2 stock of fiscal capacity, τ2.
(3) O1 observes τ2 and decides whether or not to start a civil war. At the same time,
an interstate conflict between F and D occurs with probability α.
◦ If there is no interstate conflict or civil war, O1 wins the election with probability
 and I1 remains in office with probability 1− .
◦ If there is no interstate conflict but there is a civil war, O1 forms the new govern-
ment with probability δ, and I1 remains in office with probability 1− δ.
◦ If there is an interstate conflict and a civil war, O1 is the new government with
probability ω+ρλ, F establishes a foreign administration with probability ρ(1−λ)
and I1 remains in power with probability 1− ω − ρ.
◦ If there is an interstate conflict but no civil war, O1 is the new government with
probability µλ, F establishes a foreign administration with probability µ(1 − λ)
and I1 remains in power with probability 1− µ.
(4) I2 ∈ {A,B, F} chooses a set of period-2 policies {t2, r2 = {rA2 , rB2 , rF2 }}.
Preferences
The utility function of a typical member of group J ∈ {A,B} in period s is
uJs = (1− ts)m+ rJs (4)
where m is an exogenous income, ts is the income tax rate and rJs is the government
transfer. The utility function of a typical individual in group F in period s is
uFs = rFs (5)
where rFs is the transfer. Note that since F is a foreign group, members of F are not
taxed by the government of country D.
Government budget constraint
The income tax rate, ts, is constrained by the existing fiscal capacity, τs, such that
ts ≤ τs. In addition, τs, initially set to τ1, can be augmented by non-negative investment
in period 1, with increasing and strictly convex costs C(τ2 − τ1), where Cτ (0) = 0, with
Cτ denoting the partial derivative. Finally, the total population of both D and F is
normalized to one. Thus, the government budget constraint is20
Budget constraint ≡
{
t1m = C(τ2 − τ1) + (rA1 + rB1 )/2 + rF1 in period s = 1
t2m = (rA2 + rB2 )/2 + rF2 in period s = 2
(6)
20For a more general case in which D is composed of groups with different populations, the budget
constraint will be t1m = C(τ2−τ1)+βArA1 +βBrB1 +rF1 in period 1 and t2m = βArA2 +βBrB2 +rF2 in period
2, where βJ is the population share of group J ∈ {A,B}. As previously mentioned, that βA = βB = 1/2
is without loss of generality for the main results. Results for the general case are available upon request.
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Allocation of transfers
In the baseline model, I assume that the opposition must receive a fixed share of
the government’s transfers to its own members. I distinguish between two cases: one in
which the government is one of the domestic groups, A or B, and the other in which the
government is the foreign country, F . For the first case, I assume that
rOss = σDrIss (7)
where Is, Os ∈ {A,B}, and where σD ∈ [0, 1] denotes the fixed share of Is’s transfers
that must be given to the domestic opposition, Os.21 This extremely simple way of
modelling the allocation of transfers, which closely follows B&P’s framework, tries to
capture the existence of institutional arrangements that make policymakers internalize
the preferences of a larger share of the population. In this respect, σD can be interpreted
as the level of cohesiveness of institutions. One real-world example might be the level of
protection for minorities resulting from constraints on the executive (e.g. a constitutional
separation of powers). Another example might be the strength of the opposition’s political
representation in policy decisions, such as through proportional representation elections.
Since both interpretations of σD suggest that it represents the domestic rules under
which decisions are made, it is crucial to have an intuition for where it comes from.
In Section 3.4, I propose an extension of the baseline model in which σD results from
a bargaining process between the domestic government and opposition. In this specific
context, σD can be interpreted as the institutional arrangement that guarantees that in
period 2, when the government is a domestic group and I1’s probability of reelection is
sufficiently high, O1 will receive a large enough transfer to dissuade it from triggering a
civil war in period 1.
When F takes power in period 2, the opposition consists of two groups (A and B),
and it is reasonable to expect that their transfers are group-specific. In this scenario, I
assume that O1 will receive a larger share of F ’s transfers. A justification may be that
since D is governed by I1 when the interstate conflict takes place, F might see I1 as its
main enemy. Thus, when there is a foreign administration, we can expect that I1 will be
hit the hardest. To simplify the exposition, I1’s share of transfers are set to zero, i.e.,
rI12 = 0× rF2 . As for I1, I define
rO12 = σF rF2 (8)
where σF ∈ [0, 1] denotes the fixed share of F ’s transfers that must be given to O1.22
For an intuition about where σF comes from, first note that σF regulates the allocation
of transfers between a foreign country occupying D, and a domestic group in D. This
suggests that it may not be appropriate to think of σF as constitutional checks and
21Note that for the case of I2 = O1, (7) implies that the period-2 government must give σD to the
opposition regardless of whether O1 came to power through a civil war. This assumption is inconsistent
with a successful revolution by the domestic opposition affecting the level of institutional cohesiveness in
the country (as in Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 2001). In the online Appendix, I consider an extension
of the basic model in which σD = 0 when I2 = O1 after a civil war. The main results hold.
22I assume that σF is known to all the players. However, the main results are consistent with a model
in which σF is known to both O1 and F , but not to I1.
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balances. To keep the model simple and tractable, I do not propose any process to derive
σF ; I simply assume that σF is exogenous. A very high-level intuition is possible: σF
may result from a previous bargaining process between O1 and F , the outcome of which
may be based on a shared trait (e.g. ethnicity, ideology, or geography). In this sense, σF
can be also understood as an ex-ante level of disunity between the government and the
opposition in a country (relative to that between the opposition and a foreign country).
The literature on the transnational dimensions of civil wars suggest that these kinds of
factors can play an important role in explaining military decisions (see Davis and Moore,
1997; Gleditsch, 2007; Gleditsch et al., 2008; Cederman et al., 2009, 2013; Cunningham
et al., 2011).
3.2 Equilibrium Policy
I will now solve the game by backward induction. Leaving the formal derivation to
Appendix A.2, here I focus on the main equilibrium decisions.
Civil war
The first main equilibrium decision is O1’s decision about whether to start a civil war.
When deciding whether to trigger a civil war, O1 evaluates its expected utility based on
each possible outcome. After computing and comparing O1’s expected utilities depending
on whether there is civil war or internal peace, it is possible to show (see Appendix A.2)
that O1 decides to trigger a civil war when σF > σF , where
σF ≡ 2
(
α(ρ− µ)(σD − λ)− (1− σD)(αω + (1− α)δ − (1− α)))
α(ρ− µ)(1− λσD) + (1− σD)(αω + (1− α)δ − (1− α)) (9)
provided that the denominator is positive. Note that in (9), we have defined a threshold
value for σF , σF , such that when σF > σF , O1 decides to trigger a civil war, and when
σF ≤ σF , O1 decides not to start a civil war.
From (9), note that when σD = 0, σF > σF , so internal peace is only possible for pos-
itive levels of institutional cohesiveness (i.e for σD > 0). When institutions are perfectly
cohesive (i.e. when σD = 1), there is no civil war (i.e. σF < σF ). More generally, it is
possible to show that a civil war is less likely for higher levels of institutional cohesiveness
(see Appendix A.2). This is consistent with the finding that countries with many checks
and balances tend to be less prone to civil wars (Reynal-Querol, 2002, 2005).
Also note from (9) that a higher λ increases the chances of a civil war (see Appendix
A.2 for a proof). So in countries where a foreign power is more likely to intervene to help
the opposition (rather than to establish a foreign administration), the opposition is more
prone to starting a civil war. If a larger λ characterizes more modern forms of conflict
(e.g. those occurred during the post-World War II period, as briefly discussed in footnote
15), then this result is consistent with the increase in the number of internal conflicts in
the last 60 years (Strand et al., 2019).
It is also possible to show from (9) that an increased risk of an external conflict may
increase or decrease the chances of a civil war. This depends on how the probability that
O1 gains power in period 2 changes in the absence of an external conflict: when a civil
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war is very attractive when there is no risk of external conflict, then an increased risk of
external conflict makes a civil war less attractive (see Appendix A.2).
Investment in fiscal capacity
The second main equilibrium decision is I1’s decision to invest in fiscal capacity. To
simplify notation and analysis, I define the unconditional probability of political turnover
from I1’s perspective, i.e. the probability that, from I1’s perspective, I2 6= I1. Let φ
denote this probability, where
φ = γ(αω + (1− α)δ + αρ) + (1− γ)(αµ+ (1− α)) (10)
where γ = γ(σF ) is the indicator function taking the value of 1 if σF > σF and 0
otherwise.23
After computing I1’s first- and second-period indirect utilities, as well as I1’s expected
utility as seen from period 1, it is possible to show (see Appendix A.2, proof of Prop. 1)
that the τ2 that maximizes I1’s expected utility is
τ∗2 = C−1τ
(
m
[− φ(1− σD)− α(γρ+ (1− γ)µ)(1− λ)σD + (1− σD)/2])+ τ1. (11)
Since this paper focuses on how the risk of an external conflict affects investments in
fiscal capacity, I look at ∂τ
∗
2
∂α
. However, given that the expression for τ ∗2 in (11) depends
on political turnover (as perceived by I1), and that political turnover will play a crucial
role in the interpretation of the main results, I start by identifying the conditions under
which an increased risk of an external conflict increases or decreases φ.
Proposition 1. Consider the above-described game. Then, there is a unique threshold
for σF , denoted by σF and given by (9), such that in equilibrium:
(1.A) If σF > σF , an increased risk of an external conflict increases φ.
(1.B) If σF ≤ σF , an increased risk of an external conflict decreases φ.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Prop. 1 states that an increased risk of an external conflict can either increase or
decrease political turnover (as perceived by the period-1 incumbent, I1), and that this
depends on the size of the transfers that the period-1 opposition (O1) expects to receive
if there is a foreign administration in period 2 (which, as previously mentioned, can be
understood as a measure of the ex-ante level of disunity between the government and the
opposition). Importantly, Prop. 1 shows that a higher risk of external conflict can decrease
political turnover (Prop. 1.B) and this happens because the higher risk of external conflict
23When σF is unknown to I1, γ denotes I1’s beliefs about σF .
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makes O1 less belligerent.24 In this scenario, I1 is strengthened domestically when the
reduction in O1’s belligerence outweighs the higher probability that F wins power.
Now I examine how an increased risk of external conflict affects investments in fiscal
capacity. The following proposition summarizes the result, which constitutes the first
main result of the paper.
Proposition 2. Consider the above-described game. Then, there is a unique threshold
for σF , denoted by σF and given by (9), such that in equilibrium:
(2.A) If σF > σF , then an increase in the risk of external conflict decreases investments
in fiscal capacity.
(2.B) If σF ≤ σF , then:
(2.B.1) If ( − µ) > σD( − λµ), an increase in the risk of external conflict increases
investments in fiscal capacity.
(2.B.2) If ( − µ) = σD( − λµ), an increase in the risk of external conflict does not
affect investments in fiscal capacity.
(2.B.3) If ( − µ) < σD( − λµ), an increase in the risk of external conflict decreases
investments in fiscal capacity.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Prop. 2 states that an increase in the risk of external conflict can either increase or
decrease the government’s incentives to invest in fiscal capacity; this depends on the size
of the transfers that the period 1 opposition (O1) expects to receive if there is a foreign
administration. As previously mentioned, the intuition for this result crucially depends
on how an increased risk of external conflict affects political turnover, and, specifically, on
whether a heightened risk of an external conflict increases the chance that the incumbent
in period 1 (I1) gets support from O1, so that I1 strengthens its domestic support.
Prop. 2.A considers the case where I1 does not expect to receive any support from
O1 because O1 is expected to receive large transfers if there is a foreign administration.
In this scenario, O1 sees an opportunity to weaken I1 by triggering an internal conflict.
The consequence is that I1 expects a higher likelihood of political turnover (Prop. 1.A),
which reduces its incentives to increase period-2 fiscal capacity.25
24This result can be interpreted as specifying how a sense of national identity that creates common
interests can be actively fostered: when the ex-ante level of disunity between the government and the
opposition is sufficiently small, a foreign invasion is more likely to be perceived as a common threat,
so when that threat increases, national cohesiveness, reflected in a lower probability of civil war, also
increases. This interpretation is consistent with the literature on endogenous social identity (for example,
see Shayo, 2009), providing an alternative mechanism through which a sense of identity and belonging to
a polity can be reinforced.
25This result is consistent with the Mexican-American War (discussed in Section 2) and the Shaba wars
(discussed in Appendix A.1): the absence of any strong sense of unity could have increased the risk of a
coup, which in turn could have given the Mexican and DRC governments incentives to raise revenues by
means other than direct taxation.
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Prop. 2.B considers the case where O1 expects to receive small transfers if there is
a foreign administration. In this scenario, I1 expects to receive support from O1, which
increases I1’s expectation of staying in period 2 (Prop. 1.B). This proposition identifies
a new condition under which the lower probability of turnover, as seen by I1, provides I1
with enough incentives to increase period-2 fiscal capacity.26
The explanation for the new condition is as follows. First, note that it relates two
terms: first, a term that represents the magnitude of the increase in I1’s expectation of
staying in power in period 2, ( − µ), which results from an increased risk of external
conflict; and second, a term that represents the magnitude of the decrease in the chance
that O1 is in power in period 2, ( − λµ), multiplied by the level of cohesiveness of
institutions, σD.27 When the first term is greater than the second term, an increased
risk of external conflict increases investment in fiscal capacity (Prop. 2.B.1), and when
the first term is smaller than (or equal to) the second term, an increased risk of external
conflict does not increase investment in fiscal capacity (Props. 2.B.2 and 2.B.3).
The intuition for when the first term is greater (or smaller) than the second term
crucially depends on σD. To see this, note that the only benefit to I1 of a higher probability
of staying in power in period 2 (which we know happens because of Prop. 1.B) is that
second-period rent extraction becomes more likely. The costs include a higher probability
that F extracts I1’s period-2 rents (because a foreign administration becomes more likely),
and a lower probability that I1 receives transfers from O1 in period 2 (because the chance
that O1 is in power in period 2 decreases). Importantly, both the amount of rents I1
expects to capture if it stays in power, and the transfers I1 expects to receive if O1 is
in power in period 2, inversely depend on the cohesiveness of institutions: the weaker
the government institutions, the more rents can be captured by the incumbent and the
smaller the share that must be transferred to the opposition. So, if I1 expects that rent
extraction is more likely, and the value of the rents that it can capture is relatively high,28
then I1’s marginal benefit from investing more in fiscal capacity can be relatively high.
In addition, if I1 expects that O1 will not be in power in period 2, then the fact that O1
would be able to capture more rents if it were in power in period 2 becomes less costly. In
this scenario, investment in period-2 fiscal capacity is more likely, as stated in Proposition
2.B.1.
The intuition for Propositions 2.B.2 and 2.B.3 is similar: the stronger the government
institutions, the less rents can be captured by the incumbent and the greater the share
that must be transferred to the opposition. Thus, if I1 expects that rent extraction is
more likely, but the value of the rents that it can capture is relatively low, then I1’s
marginal benefit from investing more in fiscal capacity can be relatively low. In addition,
26This result is consistent with Guerrero’s presidency (discussed in Section 2): in the early months
of this presidency, there was a high risk of reconquest by Spain, and most Mexicans sided with the
government in strongly opposing Spain (recall that the Mexican government had massively expelled
people who may have eventually sided with Spain). This unity may have decreased the risk of political
turnover, giving Guerrero incentives to insist, successfully, on the introduction of a national income tax.
27Note that the increased chance that I1 stays in power is smaller than the decreased chance that O1
is in power in period 2 (i.e, (− µ) < (− λµ)); thus, it matters that (− λµ) is multiplied by σD.
28But not too high, because if so, O1 would prefer to trigger a civil war (as in Prop. 2.A).
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Figure II: Parameters and different types of outcomes
Other simulation parameter values: α = 0.5, ρ = 0.5,
ω = 0.5, δ = 0.4, µ = 0.1, σF = 0.1, λ = 0
if I1 expects that O1 is not in power in period 2, then O1 being able to capture less rents
if it were in power in period 2 is more costly.
Figure II illustrates the conditions under which an increased risk of external conflict
increases or decreases investments in fiscal capacity for combinations of the key parameters
mentioned in Prop. 2 (σD and  − µ). The figure illustrates the intuition proposed in
the last paragraphs for the conditions for an increase in fiscal capacity to result from
an increased risk of external conflict: it requires i) an intermediate level of institutional
cohesiveness, and ii) a sufficiently high increase in I1’s expectation of staying in power in
period 2.
An additional result can be found by looking at how the conditions in Props. 2.B.1
to 2.B.3 depend on whether a foreign intervention results in the strengthening of the
domestic opposition rather than in a foreign administration (i.e. how they depend on λ).
In this respect, note that the condition in 2.B.1 (i.e. (− µ) > σD(− λµ)) is more likely
to be satisfied when a foreign intervention strengthens the domestic opposition (i.e. when
λ is big), and less likely when it results in a foreign administration (i.e. when λ is small).
The intuition is straightforward, and sheds additional light on the costs associated with
interstate conflicts that result in a foreign administration: since I1’s worst-case scenario is
a foreign administration, state-building is more likely when a direct foreign intervention
primarily seeks a new distribution of power between the domestic actors.
Propositions 1.B and 2.B and the explanation proposed in the last paragraph reveal
an interesting characteristic of the state-building process: although political stability
crucially affects incentives for state-building, more political stability does not always imply
more state-building. This is summarized in the following proposition, which constitutes
the second main result of the paper.
Proposition 3. Consider the above-described game. Then, there is a unique threshold
for σF , denoted by σF and given by (9), such that in equilibrium:
(3.A) If σF > σF , an increased risk of external conflict implies an increase in φ and
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decreased investment in fiscal capacity.
(3.B) If σF ≤ σF , then:
(3.B.1) If ( − µ) > σD( − λµ), an increase in the risk of external conflict implies a
decrease in φ and increased investment in fiscal capacity.
(3.B.2) If ( − µ) ≤ σD( − λµ), an increase in the risk of external conflict implies a
decrease in φ but not increased investment in fiscal capacity.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Prop. 3 is consistent with the important but still scarce literature on the relationship
between greater political stability and weaker public policies, particularly an interesting
result by Acemoglu et al. (2011): greater stability might harm the party in power because
when power finally shifts, the new government is more likely to remain in power, keeping a
bigger share of rents and leaving less to the former government. Prop. 3.B contributes to
this idea by providing a novel mechanism through which more political stability might be
associated with worse outcomes, and in which the origin of the greater political stability
is key: when greater political stability results from an increased risk of external conflict,
the higher chance that the government loses power to the foreign country means that the
costs associated with more fiscal capacity in period 2 are higher, so only non-cohesive
institutions can give the government enough incentives to invest in fiscal capacity.29
3.3 Endogenous political institutions
In this section, I expand the choices in the baseline model to include the level of
cohesiveness of institutions, σD. I consider a very simple way in which this parameter
can change: it results from a bargaining process between the period-1 government and
the opposition.
In the new scenario, the level of cohesiveness of institutions is specific to each period,
so we have σD1 for period 1 and σD2 for period 2; σF is still exogenous.
The analysis focuses on σD2 . Importantly, I assume that σD2 represents a constitutional
change made one period ahead, and that an agreement, if reached, deters the domestic
opposition from starting a civil war and ensures the period-2 government does not use
its power to modify σD2 .30 This assumption is weaker than in the baseline model, and
although it could be still regarded as a strong assumption, it is not uncommon in the
literature on endogenous institutions.31 A possible intuition is an agreement that includes,
29Note that this result cannot be deduced from B&P’s model, since for them an increase in the risk
of external conflict always increases the value of a common-interest public good, so greater political
stability that results from a greater risk of external conflict always implies more incentives to invest in
fiscal capacity.
30The new timing of the game differs from the baseline model in that at stage 2, the second-period polit-
ical institutions σD2 are chosen. At stage 1, nature decides the initial level of cohesiveness of institutions,
σD1 . In this scenario, I introduce two new assumptions: i) 1/2 ≥  and ii)  = δ. The first assumption is
plausible in scenarios in which each group makes up half of the population (which we assume) and where
there is some incumbent advantage. The second assumption simplifies the exposition.
31In addition to B&P, see Aghion et al. (2004), Ticchi and Vindigni (2010) and Acemoglu et al. (2013).
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on the one hand, significant transaction costs in unilaterally changing future key political
institutions (for instance, through entrenched clauses that impose constitutional limits on
the government) and, on the other hand, refraining from the use of violence for political
purposes (for example, through the disarmament of O1).
The bargaining process is modeled as a very simple “divide-the-dollar” game. First,
the period-1 government, I1, offers a certain value of σD2 to the opposition, O1. O1 then
chooses whether to accept the offer, taking into account that if it accepts, the proposed
value of σD2 will determine both O1’s and I1’s transfers in the second period provided that
one of the domestic groups is in power in period 2. If O1 accepts the offer, the constitution
will be implemented in period 2 if there is no foreign administration, and each domestic
group will receive a transfer determined by (7). If O1 rejects the offer, σD2 is set at its
lowest level, i.e. σD2 = 0, which can be interpreted as a situation in which σD1 = 0, and
the status quo is maintained. Finally, if O1 accepts the offer, it commits to not starting
a civil war.32
To solve this variation of the model, I proceed by backward induction, first considering
O1’s choice at stage 2, and then the conditions under which it is optimal for I1 to offer
something that O1 will accept. The following proposition summarizes the main result:
Proposition 4. Consider the above-described game with σD2 resulting from a bargaining
process between the period-1 government and the opposition. Consider the inequalities
αω + αρλ+ αµ(1− λ)/2 + (1− α)δ + α(ρ− µ)(1− λ)σF /(2 + σF ) ≤ 1/2 (12)
(1−α)+αµ(1 +λ)/2 < αω+αρλ+αµ(1−λ)/2 + (1−α)δ+α(ρ−µ)(1−λ)σF /(2 +σF ) (13)
Then,
(4.A) if (12) and (13) are satisfied, the period-1 government will offer σD∗2 > 0, and the
opposition will accept it, where
σD
∗
2 =
α(ω + (ρ− µ)λ) + α(ρ− µ)(1− λ)σF /(2 + σF )
1− α(ω + µ+ ρλ)− 2(1− α)− α(ρ− µ)(1− λ)σF /(2 + σF ) (14)
(4.B) if (12) is satisfied but (13) is not satisfied, the period-1 government will offer σD∗2 = 0
and the opposition will accept the offer.
(4.C) if (12) is not satisfied, the period-1 government will offer σD∗2 = 0, and the opposition
will reject the offer.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The condition in (12) guarantees that I1 will make an offer that O1 will accept, which
implies that there won’t be an internal conflict. When (12) holds, (13) determines whether
the level of cohesiveness of institutions is greater than zero.
32The opposition takes into account its commitment not to start a civil war when determining whether
or not to accept the offer. As previously mentioned, the commitment can be interpreted as resulting from
a peace deal in which the opposition may have turned over its weapons in exchange for a certain level of
cohesiveness of institutions protected by a set of entrenched clauses.
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The intuition for these results is the following. First, note that when (12) holds, the
probability that O1 takes power through a civil war and O1’s marginal benefit in the event
of a foreign conflict cannot be very high. This implies that O1 will accept the offer because
these expressions are directly proportional to O1’s bargaining power, so when they are
sufficiently small, so is this power. When (13) also holds (Prop. 4.A), the condition can
also be related to O1’s bargaining power, but now implies that it cannot be extremely low.
Since in this scenario the probability of political turnover is small, O1 expects that I1 is in
power in period 2, so O1’s bargaining power implies that I1 has to propose a positive —
but not necessarily high — level of checks and balances for period 2. When (13) does not
hold (Prop. 4.B), O1’s bargaining power is extremely low, so O1 will accept any proposal,
including I1’s preferred alternative, where the level of institutional cohesiveness is null.
Note that the equilibrium level of cohesiveness of institutions in (14) increases with
σF and α.33 The intuition is similar to that previously mentioned: having closer links
with F and a higher risk of an attack by F increases O1’s reservation utility, so I1 has to
propose more checks and balances in period 2 to give O1 sufficient incentive to accept the
offer.
As for how the risk of external conflict affects investment in fiscal capacity, note that
Prop. 1 may not apply to this scenario because now σD∗2 can increase in α. The following
proposition summarizes this effect:
Proposition 5. Consider the above-described game with σD2 resulting from a bargaining
process between the period-1 government and the opposition. Then:
(5.A) if (12) and (13) are satisfied, an increase in the risk of an external conflict does not
increase investment in fiscal capacity.
(5.B) if (12) is satisfied but (13) is not satisfied, and if (−µ) > σD∗2 (−λµ), an increase
in the risk of external conflict increases investment in fiscal capacity.
(5.C) if (12) is not satisfied, an increase in the risk of external conflict decreases invest-
ment in fiscal capacity.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The intuition for Prop. 5.A is the following. First, note that a higher risk of external
conflict improves O1’s outside option, since it makes it more likely that O1 takes power in
the event of a civil war. Second, note that the increase in O1’s reservation utility makes
an agreement more costly for I1 in terms of having to accept more checks and balances
in period 2. Third, note that if an agreement is reached, there won’t be civil war and I1’s
probability of re-election will increase in the event of an external conflict. In this scenario,
Prop. 5.A states that I1 has no incentive to invest in fiscal capacity because the costs
associated with its decreased capacity to extract rents in period 2 are now too high.34
33 That ∂σD∗2 /∂σF > 0 follows directly from the fact that σF /(2 + σF ) is strictly increasing in σF . As
for ∂σD∗2 /∂α > 0, see Appendix A.2 (proof of Proposition 5).
34For the same reason, when in equilibrium institutions are expected to be very cohesive, i.e. when
σD
∗
2 = 1, I1 does not have an incentive to increase fiscal capacity either. We also don’t expect an increase
in investment in fiscal capacity when there is no agreement and a civil war is expected to occur: the
increased likelihood of turnover is so big that it outweighs the potential for rent extraction.
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Importantly, note that Prop. 5.A holds even though when an agreement is reached, I1
expects a decrease in political turnover. This allows us to ask about the role of political
turnover in this new result. In this respect, note that the result in Prop. 5.A is consistent
with the most important result in Prop. 3: a decrease in political turnover may not
result in increased investment in fiscal capacity when the decrease in political turnover
is a consequence of an increased risk of external conflict. The intuition here is the same;
the only difference is that now the level of institutional cohesiveness is endogenous. So,
in some sense, Prop. 5.A generalizes Prop. 3.B.35
Proposition 5.B shows that an increased risk of external conflict can increase invest-
ments in fiscal capacity. This occurs when O1’s bargaining power is very weak, so I1 can
get support from O1 even though the level of cohesiveness of institutions is very low and
I1 expects to be re-elected. This result sheds light on what adds the variation proposed
in this section to Prop. 2. Note that when the level of cohesiveness of institutions results
from a bargaining process between I1 and O1, an increased risk of external conflict implies
less investment in fiscal capacity because I1, through a decrease in its capacity to extract
rents in period 2, internalizes the costs associated with O1’s support being more diffi-
cult to obtain. Crucially, note that the internalization of costs through a higher level of
institutional cohesiveness only occurs when the equilibrium level of cohesiveness of insti-
tutions is not extremely low. When it is, and O1’s bargaining power is ex ante extremely
low, as it is the case in Prop. 5.B; the equilibrium level of cohesiveness of institutions is
not affected by an increased risk of external conflict; and changes to investment in fiscal
capacity only depend on the relationships between the other parameters.
4 Conclusion
Most of the recent literature on state capacity assumes that threats from external en-
emies generate common interests among groups in society, leading to larger investments
in state capacity. In addition, external and internal disputes are viewed as being indepen-
dent of each other. However, a large number of cases and some cross-country correlations
suggest that this might not be the case. In particular, this assumption seems inconsistent
with state-building processes during post-independence and Cold War periods in several
countries in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and southeast Asia.
Motivated by these observations, this paper develops a model where interstate conflicts
and civil wars can be related, and in which interstate wars are not always a common-
interest public good. In the model, a government faces two threats: one from a foreign
country, and another from a domestic opposition. Crucially, the model allows for an
opposition and government that place different values on a potential victory by the foreign
country. A first main result establishes that in equilibrium, the risk of external conflict
contributes to fiscal capacity only when the share of transfers that the internal opposition
35However, Props. 4 and 5 differ with Prop. 3 in one aspect: an increased risk of external conflict also
decreases the chance that (12) is satisfied. To see this, differentiate the left side of (12) with respect to α
and note that by (2), the resulting expression is always positive, so a higher risk of external threat makes
it less likely that (12) is satisfied.
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expects if it supports the government is sufficiently large relative to what it expects from
a foreign administration.
The interplay between external threats, political turnover and investment in fiscal ca-
pacity leads to a second important result: while a greater likelihood of political turnover
translates into less fiscal capacity, a lower probability of political turnover does not neces-
sarily imply more state-building. The link between political turnover and state-building
depends on the cohesiveness of institutions and on the fact that an increased risk of ex-
ternal conflict reduces the likelihood of political turnover. If institutions are sufficiently
cohesive, the gains from political stability might not outweigh the more probable losses
resulting from a foreign administration, which means that decreased political turnover
could actually lead to less state-building.
An extension of the baseline model that endogenizes the level of cohesiveness of insti-
tutions is also proposed. In this extension, the cohesiveness of institutions results from
a constitutional stage in which the government and opposition play a simple “divide-the-
dollar” game. The results in this extension are consistent with those in baseline model.
I view this paper as a first step towards a more systematic analysis of the process
of state-building when countries experience different but related conflicts. I develop a
simple model to study a specific aspect of this process: the construction of two specific
institutions in a country consisting of two domestic actors that face an exogenous external
threat. Many aspects of this process have been left out, such as the source of the external
threat and how the losing domestic actor and former incumbent behaves when the foreign
country wins the interstate conflict. These are important and exciting areas for future
research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Additional Case-Based Evidence: The Shaba Wars
This appendix briefly discusses a case study from the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC) during Mobutu Sese Seko’s rule. Like the Mexican case studies discussed in Section
2, the DRC case study illustrates how the risk of a foreign intervention, and government and
opposition responses to that risk, explain important aspects of the state-building process.
DRC’s early years as an independent country were chaotic. In 1965, a new regime took power
led by President Mobutu, which sought to distance itself from the previous regime. Mobutu’s
regime would last for nearly 32 years. It progressed through various phases, all having two com-
mon elements: the occurrence of several conflicts closely tied to the Cold War, and patrimonial
predatory practices with almost no effort toward building strong economic institutions (Young
and Turner, 1985, chs. 2, 10-12.; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, ch. 5).
I will now discuss a period characterized by two wars, known as the Shaba wars, in more
detail. The Shaba wars occurred in 1977 and 1978, after a decade during which Mobutu had been
“relatively successful in reuniting most of the country, and ending previous disorder” (Young,
1984, p. 733). The wars were triggered by an invasion of the Shaba province (today named
Katanga) by rebels based in Angola and led by former Katangan exiled gendarmes.36 The
militia sought to conquer the region and remove Mobutu from power (Ndikumana and Emizet,
2005, pp. 71-75). These wars coincided with a peak in US and Soviet Union interventionism
(Westad, 2005, p. 4).37
The Shaba invasions were a major challenge to Mobutu’s rule (Ndikumana and Emizet, 2005,
p. 71), so much so that “his dominion had nearly collapsed twice with the Shaba interventions”
(Hesselbein, 2007, p. 33). Importantly, as in the case of the Mexican-American war, the invaders
were “warmly received by many” and “the demoralization and incapacity of the security forces
were plainly evident to all” (Young and Turner, 1985, p. 75).38 Following the invasion, which
Mobutu fought off with the aid of both France and the US, the rebel forces withdrew with their
numbers largely intact, and it is plausible that the rebels “continued to pose a threat because
of their ability to move amongst the civilian Zairian population” (Larmer 2013).
This period was also characterized by the establishment of a complex patrimonial system in
which economic resources and key offices were exchanged for personal loyalty and service to the
president (Young and Turner, 1985, ch. 6). Besides ending a decade of relative order and unity,
Crawford Young sees the period as a turning point at which Mobutu began to appear predatory:
Until that point ... [Mobutu] appeared to cling to the illusion that he could at once realize the
grandiose dreams for the country that he ceaselessly proclaimed ... past this point, personal rule
36The term “invasion” is debated as the attacks were carried out by people of Cogolese descent, but it
is plausible that Mobutu viewed the attacks as a foreign intervention.
37In particular, they occurred when there was a significant risk of Soviet intervention following Soviet
involvement in Angola (Young and Turner, 1985, pp. 376-378). Even though the Soviet Union desired
the overthrow of Mobutu’s regime and the militia used Soviet arms (Young and Turner, 1985, p. 423),
there seems to be no evidence of direct Soviet involvement in the invasion (Young and Turner 1985, p.
75 and Larmer 2013).
38Mobutu was aware of this division and lack of commitment when he declared in a major address
that this crisis had revealed the betrayal of many high-placed cadres, “who expressed doubts, began to
distance themselves, kept one foot in each camp, hesitated to wear their party buttons, and privately
predicted the downfall of the regime” (Young and Turner, 1985, p. 74).
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became what Juan Linz, borrowing a Weberian term, labels ‘sultanism’, whereby ‘personalistic
and particularistic use of power for essentially private ends of the ruler and his collaborators makes
the country essentially like a huge domain (Young, 2012, p. 188).
And this turn was enigmatic because, as Ogunbadejo (1979) put it,
if he [Mobutu] had really wanted to, Mobutu could have mobilized the government institution
to cement national unity. Instead, he built a highly autocratic structure of government around
himself and took control of every decision from the publication of a book to the granting of an
import license, giving his ministers less and less responsibility. (Ogunbadejo, 1979, p. 33).
So why did Mobutu choose an autocratic structure of government precisely at the moment
of greater political instability? A possible explanation is that it was precisely because of the
political instability, which substantially increased during this period, as the “parliament refused
to agree to the budget ... students started to protest ... and riots in Kinshasa were such that the
regime used the troops to ‘pacify’ them” (Hesselbein, 2007, p. 32). And, as a consequence of this
significant internal pressure, “the previous elite consensus did not hold ... [so that] ... members
of the elite turned more and more to neo-patrimonial, ethnically or regionally based politics,
while Mobutu presided as the top patron over these fragmenting institutions” (Hesselbein, 2007,
p. 33).
Although the establishment of Mobutu’s patrimonial system coincided with the beginning
of the DRC’s relentless economic decline, the patrimonial system seems to have fuelled the de-
cline by undermining any alternative policy that could have built economic institutions. The
DRC faced a grave economic and financial crisis, and Mobutu sought relief from international
financial institutions. These institutions made their relief conditional on the DRC implementing
measures that could have strengthened government institutions: “reduce corruption, rationalize
and control expenditures, increase tax revenues, limit imports, boost production, improve the
transportation infrastructure, eliminate arrears on interest payments, ensure that principal pay-
ments were made on time, and improve financial management and economic planning” (Meditz
and Merrill, 1994, p. xiv), However, as Meditz and Merrill observe:
The thorough implementation of changes and reforms required by the World Bank, the IMF, and
other Western donors was perceived as a threat to the very basis of the elite’s power-access to
and free use of the nation’s resources. If the president were to execute effectively the reforms his
foreign partners demanded, the heart of his authority: complete personal discretion and the fiscal
privileges and corruption that bound the system together, would be undermined. As a result,
Mobutu and the political elite used their control of government institutions to sabotage economic
change (Meditz and Merrill, 1994, p. 146).
In the end, Mobutu obtained resources by “manipulating [the regime’s] donors’ economic
interests against one another and by exploiting foreign anxieties about the instability that might
result from a collapse of the regime” (Meditz and Merrill, 1994, p. 146). Thus, despite the
high risk of an external conflict, the existence of a closely related domestic conflict, which
coincided with the establishment of an extreme form of patrimonialism, blocked any effort to
build economic institutions (Kaiser and Wolters, 2012, pp. 76-77).
As was the case with the Mexican-American war, this additional case study illustrates a
mechanism through which the risk of external conflict can reduce incentives to invest in fiscal
capacity: the risk of a victory by the insurgents seems to have reduced the chances of state-
building reforms insofar as they made a collapse of Mobutu’s regime more likely. This instability
seems to have been key in the establishment of a patrimonial regime bent on holding onto power
by any means possible.
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A.2 Proofs of the Results
Derivation of threshold in Eq. (9). I start by studying the optimal policy chosen by the
government in period 2 (stage 4). There are two possible cases: one in which the government
is one of the domestic groups (i.e. I2 ∈ {A,B}), and the other in which the government is the
foreign power (i.e. I2 = F ). For I2 ∈ {A,B}, I2 chooses {t2, r2 = {rA2 , rB2 , rF2 }} to maximize
(4), subject to (6), (7) and t2 ≤ τ2. It is easy to see that we have a corner solution with t2 = τ2,
rF2 = 0, rO22 = σDr
I2
2 and r
I2
2 = 2τ2m/(1 + σD). For I2 = F , F chooses {t2, r2 = {rA2 , rB2 , rF2 }}
to maximize (5) subject to t2 ≤ τ2, (6) and (8). In this case we have that t2 = τ2, rI12 = 0,
rO12 = σF rF2 , and rF2 = 2τ2m/(2 + σF ).
I now study O1’s decision about whether to start a civil war. Let WO1(τ2|I2 = K) be O1’s
period-2 indirect utility if group J ∈ {I1, O1, F} is the government in period 2.
For I2 ∈ {A,B}, replacing rI22 = 2τ2m/(1 + σD) and rO22 = σDrI22 in (4), we have that O1’s
period-2 indirect utility given that O1 is the government in period 2 (i.e. I2 = O1) is
WO1(τ2|I2 = O1) = (1− τ2)m+ 2τ2m/(1 + σD) (A.1)
When I1 remains in power in period 2 (i.e. I2 = I1), O1’s period-2 indirect utility is given by
WO1(τ2|I2 = I1) = (1− τ2)m+ 2σDτ2m/(1 + σD) (A.2)
For I2 = F , substituting rF2 = 2τ2m/(2 + σF ) into rO12 = σF rF2 , and using the result in (4), we
have that O1’s period-2 indirect utility is
WO1(τ2|I2 = F ) = (1− τ2)m+ 2σF τ2m/(2 + σF ) (A.3)
Now I compute O1’s expected utility. Combining (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3), with α representing
the probability of interstate conflict, we have that O1’s expected utility (in period 2) in the event
of a civil war is
α
[
(ω + ρλ)WO1(τ2|I2 = O1) + (1− ω − ρ)WO1(τ2|I2 = I1) + ρ(1− λ)WO1(τ2|I2 = F )
]
+(1− α)
[
δWO1(τ2|I2 = O1) + (1− δ)WO1(τ2|I2 = I1)
] (A.4)
and in the event of internal peace is
α
[
µλWO1(τ2|I2 = O1) + (1− µ)WO1(τ2|I2 = I1) + µ(1− λ)WO1(τ2|I2 = F )
]
+(1− α)
[
WO1(τ2|I2 = O1) + (1− )WO1(τ2|I2 = I1)
] (A.5)
Note that O1 decides whether or not to trigger a civil war by comparing (A.4) and (A.5).
Rearranging these expressions (and combining them with (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3)), it is easy to
see that O1 triggers a civil war when σF > σF .
Proof that a civil war is more likely for low values of σD. To see this, we can differen-
tiate σF in (9) with respect to σD, and rearrange to get
2α(ρ− µ)(1− λ)(α(ρ− µ)(1 + λ) + 2(αω + (1− α)δ − (1− α)))
(α(ρ− µ)(1− σDλ) + (1− σD)(αω + (1− α)δ − (1− α)))2 > 0 (A.6)
where we have used that ρ− µ > 0 (Eq. (1)).
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Proof that an increase in λ increases the chance of a civil war. To see this, we can dif-
ferentiate σF in (9) with respect to λ, and rearrange to get
− 2α(ρ− µ)(1− (σ
D)2)(α(ρ− µ) + αω + (1− α)δ − (1− α))
(α(ρ− µ)(1− σDλ) + (1− σD)(αω + (1− α)δ − (1− α)))2 < 0 (A.7)
where we have used that ρ− µ > 0 (Eq. (1)).
Proof that an increase in α may increase or decrease the chance of a civil war. To
see this, we can differentiate σF in (9) with respect to α, and rearrange to get
2(ρ− µ)(1− λ)(δ − )(1− σD)(1 + σD)
(α(ρ− µ)(1− σDλ) + (1− σD)(αω + (1− α)δ − (1− α)))2 ≷ 0. (A.8)
Note that this expression is positive when δ > , and is negative when  > δ (note that ρ−µ > 0
by (1)).
Proof of Proposition 1. I look at ∂φ∂α , where φ is given by (10). When σF ≤ σF , γ = 0, so
φ = αµ+ (1− α). Differentiating this expression with respect to α gives us
∂φ
∂α
= −(− µ) (A.9)
which by (3) is always negative. Thus, when σF ≤ σF , an increased risk of external conflict
decreases φ.
When σF > σF , γ = 1, so φ = αω + (1 − α)δ + αρ. Differentiating this expression with
respect to α gives us
∂φ
∂α
= ω − δ + ρ > 0 (A.10)
where we have used that ω−δ > 0 (Eq. (2)). Thus, when σF > σF , an increased risk of external
conflict increases φ.
Proof of Proposition 2. First, I compute period-2 optimal policies. They are similar to the
period-1 optimal policies; the only difference is that the budget constraint in period 1 includes the
costs associated with investment. I1 chooses {t1, r1 = {rA1 , rB1 , rF1 }} to maximize (4), subject
to (6) and t1 ≤ τ1. It is easy to see that we have a corner solution, with t1 = τ1, rF1 = 0,
rO11 = σDr
I1
1 and r
I1
1 = 2(τ1m− C(τ2 − τ1))/(1 + σD).
I now study the decision to invest in fiscal capacity. First, I compute I1’s first- and second-
period indirect utilities. When I1 remains in power in period 2 (i.e. I2 = I1), I1’s period-2
utility is
W I1(τ2|I2 = I1) = (1− τ2)m+ 2τ2m/(1 + σD) (A.11)
When O1 gains power in period 2 (i.e. I2 = O1), I1’s period-2 utility is
W I1(τ2|I2 = O1) = (1− τ2)m+ 2σDτ2m/(1 + σD) (A.12)
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And when F governs in period 2 (i.e. I2 = F ), I1’s period-2 indirect utility is
W I1(τ2|I2 = F ) = (1− τ2)m (A.13)
And I1’s first-period indirect utility is
W I1(τ1, C(τ2 − τ1)) = (1− τ1)m+ 2(τ1m− C(τ2 − τ1))/(1 + σD) (A.14)
I now calculate I1’s expected utility. Combining (A.11), (A.12), (A.13) and (A.14), we have
that I1’s expected utility when there is no civil war is
W I1(τ1, C(τ2 − τ1))
+α
[
(1− µ)W I1(τ2|I2 = I1) + µλW I1(τ2|I2 = O1) + µ(1− λ)W I1(τ2|I2 = F )
]
+(1− α)
[
(1− )W I1(τ2|I2 = I1) + W I1(τ2|I2 = O1)
] (A.15)
When there is a civil war, I1’s expected utility is
W I1(τ1, C(τ2 − τ1))
+α
[
(1− ω − ρ)W I1(τ2|I2 = I1) + (ω + ρλ)W I1(τ2|I2 = O1) + ρ(1− λ)W I1(τ2|I2 = F )
]
+(1− α)
[
(1− δ)W I1(τ2|I2 = I1) + δW I1(τ2|I2 = O1)
]
(A.16)
When I1 expects that there won’t be a civil war (i.e. σF ≤ σF ), I1 chooses τ2 at the beginning
of period 1 by maximizing (A.15). Differentiating (A.15) with respect to τ2, and setting it equal
to zero, gives us the first-order condition:
−W I1C (τ1, C(τ∗2 − τ1))Cτ (τ∗2 − τ1) ≥
+α
[
(1− µ)W I1τ (τ∗2 2|I2 = I1) + µλW I1τ (τ∗2 |I2 = O1) + µ(1− λ)W I1τ (τ∗2 |I2 = F )
]
+(1− α)
[
(1− )W I1τ (τ∗2 |I2 = I1) + W I1τ (τ∗2 |I2 = O1)
] (A.17)
which, rearranging, and combining it with (A.11), (A.12), (A.13) and (A.14), is equivalent to
2Cτ (τ∗2 − τ1) ≥ 2m
(
1− (1− α)(1− σD)− αµ(1− λσD))−m(1 + σD). (A.18)
From (10), we have that for no civil war, φ = αµ+ (1− α). Thus, (A.18) is equivalent to
2Cτ (τ∗2 − τ1) ≥ 2m
(
1− φ(1− σD)− αµ(1− λ)σD)−m(1 + σD). (A.19)
When I1 expects there will be a civil war (i.e. σF > σF ), I1 chooses τ2 at the beginning of
period 1 by maximizing (A.16). Differentiating (A.16) with respect to τ2, and setting it equal
to zero, gives us the first-order condition:
−W I1C (τ1, C(τ∗2 − τ1))Cτ (τ∗2 − τ1) ≥
α
[
(1− ω − ρ)W I1τ (τ∗2 |I2 = I1) + (ω + ρλ)W I1τ (τ∗2 |I2 = O1) + ρ(1− λ)W I1τ (τ∗2 |I2 = F )
]
+(1− α)
[
(1− δ)W I1τ (τ∗2 |I2 = I1) + δW I1τ (τ∗2 |I2 = O1)
] (A.20)
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which, rearranging, and combining it with (A.11), (A.12), (A.13) and (A.14), is equivalent to
2Cτ (τ∗2 − τ1) ≥ 2m
[
1− (αω + (1− α)δ + αρ) + σD(αω + (1− α)δ + αρλ)
]
−m(1 + σD).
(A.21)
From (10), we have that for civil war, φ = αω + (1− α)δ + αρ, thus the last expression is equal
to
2Cτ (τ∗2 − τ1) ≥ 2m
[
1− φ(1− σD)− αρ(1− λ)σD
]
−m(1 + σD). (A.22)
Combining the expressions in (A.19) and (A.22), recalling that γ = 1 if σF > σF and γ = 0
otherwise, we have that
2Cτ (τ∗2 − τ1) ≥ 2m
[
1− φ(1− σD)− α(γρ+ (1− γ)µ)(1− λ)σD
]
−m(1 + σD). (A.23)
Note that for τ∗2 > τ1, the complementary slackness condition implies that (A.23) holds with
equality. Solving for τ∗2 , we get (11). Note that differentiating (A.19) or (A.22) again with
respect to τ2 gives us the second-order condition −2Cττ (τ2−τ1) < 0, which is always true, given
that C(·) is strictly convex; thus, (11) gives a maximum.
From (A.23), note that τ∗2 depends on whether γ = 1 or γ = 0. In equilibrium, when
σF ≤ σF (i.e., when γ = 0), O1 decides not to trigger a civil war, and I1 chooses τ∗2 according
to (11) for γ = 0. When σF > σF (i.e., when γ = 1), O1 decides to trigger a civil war, and I1
chooses τ∗2 according to (11) for γ = 1.
Now I look at ∂τ
∗
2
∂α . For the case of σF ≤ σF , since γ = 0, we have that (11) is equal to
τ∗2 = C−1τ
(
m
[− (αµ+ (1− α))(1− σD)− αµ(1− λ)σD + (1− σD)/2])+ τ1. (A.24)
Differentiating (A.24) with respect to α, it is easy to see that, given the strict convexity of C(·),
and that m, σD and τ1 are constants, the sign of ∂τ
∗
2
∂α depends on the sign of
∂
∂α
(−(αµ+ (1− α))(1− σD)− αµ(1− λ)σD) = (− µ)(1− σD)− µ(1− λ)σD (A.25)
which, rearranging, is greater than zero if and only if
(− µ) > σD(− λµ). (A.26)
Thus, when σF ≤ σF , depending on whether ( − µ) ≷ σD( − λµ), an increase in the risk of
external conflict can increase, decrease or not affect investment in fiscal capacity.
For the case of σF > σF , since γ = 1, we have that (11) is equal to
τ∗2 = C−1τ
(
m
[− (αω + (1− α)δ + αρ)(1− σD)− αρ(1− λ)σD + (1− σD)/2])+ τ1. (A.27)
Differentiating (A.27) with respect to α, we have that the sign of ∂τ
∗
2
∂α now depends on the sign
of
∂
∂α
(−(αω+(1−α)δ+αρ)(1−σD)−αρ(1−λ)σD) = −(ω−δ+ρ)(1−σD)−ρ(1−λ)σD (A.28)
which by (2) is always negative. Thus, when σF > σF , an increased risk of an external conflict
always decreases investments in fiscal capacity.
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Proof of Proposition 3. For the case of σF > σF , it is clear from Propositions 1.A and
2.A together that an increased risk of external conflict always implies both increased political
turnover and decreased investment in fiscal capacity. For the case of σF ≤ σF , Propositions
1.A.2, 1.A.3 and 2.B together imply that an increased risk of external conflict, even though it
always implies a decrease in political turnover, may not affect (or may even decrease) investment
in fiscal capacity. This happens when, in addition to σF ≤ σF , we have that (− µ) ≤ σD(−
λµ).
Proof of Proposition 4. First, we consider O1’s choice given an offer σD
∗
2 by I1. If O1 rejects
the offer, O1 expects rO22 = 0 for I2 ∈ {A,B}, since σD2 = 0. However, this does not mean
that rO12 = 0 for all cases, since it could be that I2 = F , with which O1 could receive positive
transfers from F in period 2 or be in power thanks to F . From (9), we know that if σD2 = 0, O1
will start a civil war. In this scenario, the reservation utility of O1 will be
(αω + αρλ+ (1− α)δ)WO1(τ2|I2 = O1) + (α− αω − αρ+ (1− α)(1− δ))WO1(τ2|I2 = I1)
+αρ(1− λ)WO1(τ2|I2 = F )
(A.29)
which, from (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3), is equivalent to
2τ2m(αω + αρλ+ (1− α)δ + αρ(1− λ)σF /(2 + σF )) + (1− τ2)m. (A.30)
If O1 accepts I1’s offer, O1 will not trigger a civil war, with which it expects to get
(αµλ′ + (1− α))WO1(τ2|I2 = O1) + (α(1− µ) + (1− α)(1− ))WO1(τ2|I2 = I1)
+αµ(1− λ′)WO1(τ2|I2 = F )
(A.31)
which, again from (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3), is equivalent to
2τ2m
(
[(αµλ+(1−α))+(α(1−µ)+(1−α)(1−))σD∗2 ]/(1+σD
∗
2 )+αµ(1−λ)σF /(2+σF )
)
+(1−τ2)m.
(A.32)
Thus, O1 accepts the offer if the expression in (A.32) is greater than or equal to the expression
in (A.30); this condition is equivalent to
α(ω + (ρ− µ)λ) + α(ρ− µ)(1− λ)σF /(2 + σF ) ≤
σD
∗
2 (1− α(ω + µ+ ρλ)− (1− α)2− α(ρ− µ)(1− λ)σF /(2 + σF ))
(A.33)
where we have used the assumption that  = δ. Now we study the conditions under which it is
optimal for I1 to offer σD
∗
2 > 0 that O1 will accept. Note that if I1 offers σD2 such that (A.33)
is satisfied, in the second period I1 will get
α
[
(1− µ)W I1(τ2|I2 = I1) + µλW I1(τ2|I2 = O1) + µ(1− λ)W I1(τ2|I2 = F )
]
+(1− α)
[
(1− )W I1(τ2|I2 = I1) + W I1(τ2|I2 = O1)
]
.
(A.34)
Replacing (A.11), (A.12) and (A.13) in (A.34), and rearranging, we have that (A.34) is equal to
(1− τ2)m+ 2mτ2
[
1− αµ(1− λσD2 )− (1− α)(1− σD2 )
]
/(1 + σD2 ). (A.35)
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For the case in which I1 chooses a σD2 such that (A.33) is satisfied, we have several possibilities,
depending on the signs of the terms on the left and right sides of (A.33) (and on whether
(1 − α) ≷ 1/2). First, note that differentiating (A.35) with respect to σD2 , we obtain the
first-order condition
2τ2m(2(1− α)− 1 + αµ(1 + λ))/(1 + σD2 )2 ≤ 0 (A.36)
with the complementary slackness conditions associated with (A.33), σD2 ≥ 0 and σD2 ≤ 1.
Note that the expression in (A.36) is strictly negative when 2(1− α)− 1 + αµ(1 + λ) < 0, or,
equivalently, when 1/2 > (1−α)+αµ(1 +λ)/2. We assume that this last condition is satisfied:
1/2 > (1−α) is plausible since each group makes up half of the population, and with respect to
the additional term, we basically assume that F and O1 cannot together be extremely powerful.
If the term on the left side of (A.33) is strictly positive (i.e. α(ω+ (ρ− µ)λ) + α(ρ− µ)(1−
λ)σF /(2 + σF ) > 0), then (A.33) implies that 1 − α(ω + µ + ρλ) − (1 − α)2 − α(ρ − µ)(1 −
λ)σF /(2 + σF ) should be also strictly positive. If we look at a solution in which σD2 > 0, these
conditions, as well as (A.36) and the complementary slackness conditions imply that (A.33) is
binding, so we have (14), i.e. that
σD
∗
2 =
α(ω + (ρ− µ)λ) + α(ρ− µ)(1− λ)σF /(2 + σF )
1− α(ω + µ+ ρλ)− 2(1− α)− α(ρ− µ)(1− λ)σF /(2 + σF ) . (A.37)
To identify the cases in which σD∗2 < 1 and σD
∗
2 = 1, note that by (A.37) σD
∗
2 < 1 occurs when
αω + αρλ+ αµ(1− λ)/2 + (1− α)+ α(ρ− µ)(1− λ)σF /(2 + σF ) < 1/2. (A.38)
In this case, note also that (A.38) implies that 1 − α(ω + µ + ρλ) − 2(1 − α) − α(ρ − µ)(1 −
λ)σF /(2 + σF ) > 0 (under the assumption that 1/2 > (1 − α) + αµ(1 + λ)/2), so the first
condition is sufficient. As for σD∗2 = 1, note from (A.37) that we must have αω+ αρλ+ αµ(1−
λ)/2 + (1− α)+ α(ρ− µ)(1− λ)σF /(2 + σF ) = 1/2. This last equality, combined with (A.38),
provides the conditions under which 0 ≤ σD∗2 ≤ 1, where σD
∗
2 is given by (A.37).
As for σD∗2 = 0, note that this occurs when (A.33) is not binding. Note that this can only
be true if 1 − α(ω + µ + ρλ) − 2(1 − α) − α(ρ − µ)(1 − λ)σF /(2 + σF ) > 0 and α(ω + (ρ −
µ)λ) + α(ρ − µ)(1 − λ)σF /(2 + σF ) ≤ 0 (note that it cannot be true that both are negative
or positive and (A.33) is not binding). In this case, since as we previously showed, (A.38) and
1/2 > (1−α)+αµ(1+λ)/2 imply that 1−α(ω+µ+ρλ)−2(1−α)−α(ρ−µ)(1−λ)σF /(2+σF ) > 0,
to have σD∗2 > 0 in addition to (A.38), we need
(1−α)+αµ(1+λ)/2 < αω+αρλ+αµ(1−λ)/2+(1−α)+α(ρ−µ)(1−λ)σF /(2+σF ). (A.39)
Finally, note that when (A.38) does not hold, (A.33) is not satisfied.
Now we examine under what additional conditions I1 will offer σD
∗
2 > 0, and when it will
offer σD∗2 = 0 (or something that O1 will reject). Note that if O1 rejects the offer, I1 will get
α
[
(1− ω − ρ)W I1(τ2|I2 = I1, σD2 = 0) + (ω + ρλ)W I1(τ2|I2 = O1, σD2 = 0) + ρ(1− λ)W I1(τ2|I2 = F )
]
+(1− α)
[
(1− δ)W I1(τ2|I2 = I1, σD2 = 0) + δW I1(τ2|I2 = O1, σD2 = 0)
]
(A.40)
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where the functions W I1(·) are still defined by (A.11), (A.12) and (A.13), but now σD2 = 0.
Replacing (A.11), (A.12) and (A.13), δ = , and rearranging, we have that (A.40) is equal to
(1− τ2)m+ 2τ2mα(1− ω − ρ) + 2τ2m(1− α)(1− ). (A.41)
Thus I1 prefers to offer σD
∗
2 > 0 if the expression in (A.35) calculated at σD
∗
2 is greater than the
expression in (A.41), which, rearranging, is equivalent to
α(ω + ρ− µ) > σD∗2 (1− α(ω + ρ+ µλ)− 2(1− α)). (A.42)
For the case where σD∗2 ∈ (0, 1), note that (A.39) implies that the left side in (A.42) is always
greater than zero. Replacing σD∗2 from (A.37) in (A.42), and rearranging, we have that (A.42)
becomes
1− αµ(1 + λ)− 2(1− α) > 0 (A.43)
which is equivalent to 1/2 > (1−α)+αµ(1+λ)/2, which we assumed to be true. Thus, for this
case we can conclude that if (A.38) and (A.39) are satisfied ((12) and (13) in the main text),
there is a unique σD∗2 ∈ (0, 1) given by (A.37) ((14) in the main text) that will be proposed by
I1 and accepted by O1.
For the case of σD∗2 = 1, note that (A.42) is equivalent to
α(ω + ρ)− αµ(1− λ)/2 + (1− α) > 1/2 (A.44)
which holds when (12) is satisfied with equality.
Proof of Proposition 5. First, note that since in this scenario it may that σD2 6= σD1 , we
need to generalize the expression for τ∗2 in (11) to account for this possibility. Repeating the
procedure through which we got (11) (see the proof of Prop. 2) but distinguishing between σD1
and σD2 , we get
τ∗2 = C−1τ
(
m
(1 + σD1 )
(1 + σD2 )
[
− φ(1− σD)−α(γρ+ (1− γ)µ)(1− λ)σD + (1− σD2 )/2
])
+ τ1. (A.45)
Now we examine the effect of an increase in the risk of external conflict on τ∗2 . First, we examine
the case in which (12) and (13) hold and σD∗2 < 1. From the proof of Prop. 4, note that
σD∗2 < 1 when the inequality in (12) is strict. In this scenario, there is no civil war, so γ = 0,
and σD2 is given by (A.37) (or (14) in the main text). Also note that by assumption, σD1 = 0.
Differentiating (A.45) with respect to α, we have that the sign of ∂τ∗2 /∂α depends on the sign
of
1
(1 + σD∗2 )2
(
(1 + σD∗2 )((1− σD
∗
2 )− µ(1− λσD
∗
2 ))− (1− 2(1− α)− αµ(1 + λ))
∂σD
∗
2
∂α
)
(A.46)
where σD∗2 is given by (14). From (A.46), note that ∂τ∗2 /∂α > 0 if and only if
(1 + σD∗2 )((1− σD
∗
2 )− µ(1− λσD
∗
2 )) > (1− 2(1− α)− αµ(1 + λ))
∂σD
∗
2
∂α
. (A.47)
From this condition, note that the term on the right is non-negative. To see this, first note that
by assumptions 1/2 ≥  and (3), 1− 2(1−α)−αµ(1 + λ) > 0. As for ∂σD∗2 /∂α, differentiating
(14) with respect to α we get
∂σD
∗
2
∂α
= (1− 2)(ω + λ(ρ− µ) + (ρ− µ)(1− λ)σ
F /(2 + σF ))
(1− α(ω + µ+ ρλ)− 2(1− α)− α(ρ− µ)(1− λ)σF /(2 + σF ))2 (A.48)
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and note that the numerator is non-negative because of assumption (1) and because 1/2 ≥ .
As for the term on the left in (A.47), note that its sign depends on whether (1 − σD∗2 ) ≷
µ(1−λσD∗2 ), or equivalently, on whether (−µ) ≷ σD
∗
2 (−λµ). Also note that when (1−σD
∗
2 ) <
µ(1−λσD∗2 ), since the term on the right in A.47) is non-negative, ∂τ∗2 /∂α < 0, i.e. an increased
risk of external conflict decreases investment in fiscal capacity.
To examine the case where (1 − σD∗2 ) > µ(1 − λσD
∗
2 ), we replace (A.48) in (A.46), and
rearrange, with which we have that (A.46) is equivalent to
−
(
1−αµ(1+λ)−2(1−α)
)(1− αµ(1 + λ)− 2(1− α))((ω − ) + µ+ (ρ− µ)(λ+ (1− λ)σF /(2 + σF )))+ 2αλµ(− µλ)
(1− α(ω + µ+ ρλ)− 2(1− α)− α(ρ− µ)(1− λ)σF /(2 + σF ))2
(A.49)
which is less than zero since: (i) 1 − αµ(1 + λ) − 2(1 − α) > 0 (implied by 1/2 ≥  and
(3)), (ii) ρ > µ (by (1)), (iii) ω >  = δ (by (2)), and (iv)  > µ (because it is implied by
(1−σD∗2 ) > µ(1−λσD
∗
2 )). This shows that when (12) and (13) hold, and the inequality in (12)
is strict, ∂τ∗2 /∂α < 0, so an increased risk of external conflict does not increase investments in
fiscal capacity.
Note that from the proof of Prop. 4, σD∗2 = 1 occurs when (12) and (13) hold, and (12)
binds. As argued in the proof of Prop. 1, the first-order condition implies that Cτ (τ∗2 − τ1) ≥ 0
(with the c.s.), which implies that τ∗2 = τ1 since Cτ (0) = 0. Thus, when σD
∗
2 = 1, an increased
risk of external conflict does not affect investments in fiscal capacity.
Now we examine the case in which (12) holds but (13) is not satisfied. Note that we also
have that γ = 0, but this time σD∗2 = 0. Replacing these values in (A.45), and differentiating
with respect to α, we have that the sign of ∂τ∗2 /∂α depends on the sign of −∂φ/∂α − µ. Note
from (10) that when γ = 0, φ = (1 − α), and ∂φ/∂α = −, with which −∂φ/∂α =  − µ > 0
when (1− σD∗2 ) > µ(1− λσD
∗
2 ). Thus, in this case we have that if (1− σD
∗
2 ) > µ(1− λσD
∗
2 ),
an increased risk of external conflict increases investment in fiscal capacity.
Finally, when (12) is not satisfied, γ = 1 and σD∗2 = 0. In this scenario, differentiating τ∗2 with
respect to α we have from (A.45) that the sign of ∂τ∗2 /∂α depends on the sign of −∂φ/∂α, but in
this case have that ∂φ/∂α = ω−δ, which by (2) is strictly positive. So, −∂φ/∂α = −(ω−δ) < 0.
Thus, in this case we have that an increased risk of external conflict decreases investment in
fiscal capacity.
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Online Appendix for “External Threats, Political Turnover and
Fiscal Capacity” by Hector Galindo-Silva
In this web Appendix, I extend the baseline model to include the possibility that a civil war
affects the level of institutional cohesiveness. Specifically, I consider the case in which there is
no redistribution of resources after a revolution, i.e., that σD2 = 0 if O1 is in power in period 2
due to a civil war. I proceed as in the main text, by first examining policy-making, then the
decision to start a civil war and finally investment in fiscal capacity and political turnover.
Policy-making
We distinguish between governments led by O1, depending on whether O1 came to power
via a revolution or via an election. In both cases we still have a corner solution with t2 = τ2,
but now rI22 and r
O2
2 depend on whether O1 obtained its period-2 power through a revolution.
As previously mentioned, I assume that σD2 = 0 in the revolution scenario. From (6) and (7), it
is easy to see that rO22 = 0 and r
I2
2 = 2τ2w.
Civil war
First, I re-define O1’s period-2 indirect utility when O1 came to power via a revolution:
WO1(τ2|I2 = O1, σD2 = 0) = (1− τ2)w + 2τ2w (OA.1)
With this change, O1’s expected utility (in period 2) in the event of a civil war is now
α
[
(ω + ρλ)WO1(τ2|I2 = O1, σD2 = 0) + (1− ω − ρ)WO1(τ2|I2 = I1) + ρ(1− λ)WO1(τ2|I2 = F )
]
+(1− α)
[
δWO1(τ2|I2 = O1, σD2 = 0) + (1− δ)WO1(τ2|I2 = I1)
]
(OA.2)
and in the case of internal peace is
α
[
µλWO1(τ2|I2 = O1) + (1− µ)WO1(τ2|I2 = I1) + µ(1− λ)WO1(τ2|I2 = F )
]
+(1− α)
[
WO1(τ2|I2 = O1) + (1− )WO1(τ2|I2 = I1)
]
.
(OA.3)
Rearranging, we have that O1 triggers a civil war when
(αω + (1− α)δ)[WO1(τ2|I2 = O1, σD2 = 0)−WO1(τ2|I2 = I1)] + αρλWO1(τ2|I2 = O1, σD2 = 0)
−(1− α)[WO1(τ2|I2 = O1)−WO1(τ2|I2 = I1)]− αµλWO1(τ2|I2 = O1)
> α[ρ− µ][WO1(τ2|I2 = I1)− (1− λ)WO1(τ2|I2 = F )].
(OA.4)
Replacing (A.1), (A.2), (A.3) and (OA.1), and rearranging, this condition is equivalent to
σF
(
α(ρ− µ)(1− λσD) + αω + (1− α)δ − (1− α)(1− σD) + αρλσD)
> 2
(
α(ρ− µ)(σD − λ)− (αω + (1− α)δ) + (1− α)(1− σD)− αρλσD) (OA.5)
and we still can defined a threshold for σF , denoted by σF ′ such that there is a civil war for all
σF > σF
′ , where
σF
′ ≡ 2
(
α(ρ− µ)(σD − λ)− (αω + (1− α)δ) + (1− α)(1− σD)− αρλσD)
α(ρ− µ)(1− λσD) + αω + (1− α)δ − (1− α)(1− σD) + αρλσD (OA.6)
provided that the denominator is positive.
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Investment in fiscal capacity
As for I1’s decision to invest in fiscal capacity, I1’s utility in the event of a civil war is now
W I1(τ2|I2 = O1, σD = 0) = (1− τ2)m. (OA.7)
Thus, in the event of civil war, I1’s expected utility becomes
W I1(τ1, C(τ2 − τ1))
+α
[
(1− ω − ρ)W I1(τ2|I2 = I1) + (ω + ρλ)W I1(τ2|I2 = O1, σD = 0) + ρ(1− λ)W I1(τ2|I2 = F )
]
+(1− α)
[
(1− δ)W I1(τ2|I2 = I1) + δW I1(τ2|I2 = O1, σD = 0)
]
.
(OA.8)
Differentiating (OA.8) with respect to τ2, and setting it equal to zero, the first-order condition
is
−W I1C (τ1, C(τ∗2 − τ1))Cτ (τ∗2 − τ1) ≥
α
[
(1− ω − ρ)W I1τ (τ∗2 |I2 = I1) + (ω + ρλ)W I1τ (τ∗2 |I2 = O1, σD = 0) + ρ(1− λ)W I1τ (τ∗2 |I2 = F )
]
+(1− α)
[
(1− δ)W I1τ (τ∗2 |I2 = I1) + δW I1τ (τ∗2 |I2 = O1, σD = 0)
] (OA.9)
which, rearranging, and combining it with (A.11), (OA.7), (A.13) and (A.14), is equivalent to
2Cτ (τ∗2 − τ1) ≥ 2m
[
1− (αω + (1− α)δ + αρ)
]
−m(1 + σD) (OA.10)
with the complementary slackness condition associated to τ∗2 − τ1 ≥ 0. For τ∗2 > τ1, the com-
plementary slackness condition implies that equality holds. Thus, solving for τ∗2 , this condition
can be written as
τ∗2 = C−1τ
(
m
[− (αω + (1− α)δ + αρ) + (1− σD)/2])+ τ1. (OA.11)
Differentiating (OA.11) with respect to α and rearranging, we have that the sign of ∂τ
∗
2
∂α depends
on the sign of
∂
∂α
(
− (αω + (1− α)δ + αρ) + (1− σD)/2
)
= −(ω − δ + ρ) (OA.12)
which by (2) is strictly negative. The case of no civil war is similar to that developed in the main
text, the outcome of which is summarized in Prop. 2.B. Thus, we can formulate alternative
versions of Props. 1 and 2, which establish conditions for a change in political turnover and in
investment in fiscal capacity as a consequence of an increased risk of external conflict.
Proposition 1a. Consider the above-described game. Then, there is a unique threshold for σF ,
denoted by σF ′ and given by (OA.6), such that in equilibrium:
(1a.A) If σF > σF ′, an increased risk of external conflict increases φ.
(1a.B) If σF ≤ σF ′, an increased risk of external conflict decreases φ.
Proposition 2a. Consider the above-described game. Then, there is a unique threshold for σF ,
denoted by σF ′ and given by (OA.6), such that in equilibrium:
(2a.A) If σF > σF ′, then an increase in the risk of an external conflict decreases investments in
fiscal capacity.
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(2a.B) If σF ≤ σF ′, then:
(2a.B.1) If ( − µ) > σD( − λµ), an increase in the risk of an external conflict increases
investments in fiscal capacity.
(2a.B.2) If (−µ) = σD(−λµ), an increase in the risk of an external conflict does not affect
investments in fiscal capacity.
(2a.B.3) If ( − µ) < σD( − λµ), an increase in the risk of an external conflict decreases
investments in fiscal capacity.
Comparing (9) and (OA.6), note that σF > σF ′ . The intuition for this result is straightfor-
ward: in this extension of the baseline model, O1 has a greater incentive to start a civil war, so
the conditions for more investment in fiscal capacity are more difficult to satisfy.
Finally, I state the alternative version of Prop 3. The proof is the same as that for Prop 3.
Proposition 3a. Consider the above-described game. Then, there is a unique threshold for σF ,
denoted by σF ′ and given by (OA.6), such that in equilibrium:
(3a.A) If σF > σF ′, an increased risk of external conflict implies an increase in φ and decreased
investment in fiscal capacity.
(3a.B) If σF ≤ σF ′, then:
(3a.B.1) If ( − µ) > σD( − λµ), an increased risk of external conflict implies a decrease in
φ and increased investment in fiscal capacity.
(3a.B.2) If ( − µ) ≤ σD( − λµ), an increased risk of external conflict implies a decrease in
φ but not increased investment in fiscal capacity.
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